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Health service pay is top of the political and media 
agenda in many countries. In the UK, moral outrage 
over doctors’ payfuelled by the lay mediahas con-
tributed to a widespread belief that pay rises have soaked 
up much of the recent investment in the NHS.1 Doc-
tors’ representatives respond that rising pay reflects rising 
quality and performance, but doubts remain and even 
the government has expressed alarm, threatening to cap 
future rises. Other countries are also grappling with how 
to pay healthcare professionals, particularly doctors. 
Pay and performance
Many countries have linked the remuneration prob-
lem with concerns about quality and performance, 
focusing new attention on payment for performance 
programmes. Under these programmes a portion 
of payment is dependent on performance assessed 
against one or more defined measures.2 The United 
States has over 100 private and federal Medicare 
reward and incentive programmes,3 and Italy and 
New Zealand  are beginning to reward performance 
in primary care. The UK remains in the vanguard of 
such schemes, with the quality and outcomes frame-
work paying out around £1000m (€1300m;$2000m) 
in 2005-6 to general practices4 and being described at 
its launch as the “boldest such proposal on this scale 
ever attempted anywhere in the world.”5
Paying for performance is being given increasing 
attention across many public services, as a means of 
motivation and drawing attention to local agency.6 
Beyond these larger trends, many reasons have been 
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given for linking doctors’ pay to performance (box 1). 
Taken together, these arguments have contributed to 
a lessening of ideological debate with much of the 
deliberation now being confined to the practicalities 
of implementation. 
Pay for performance is based on the bold hope that 
the incentives offered will enhance desired behaviours 
with few unwanted effects in other areas. Yet much of 
the underpinnings of pay for performance are contest-
able at best, and the evidence supporting its benefits is 
inconclusive. We therefore need to consider the possi-
ble consequences of new programmes before they are 
introduced and monitor their effects after they are imple-
mented. Analysis of existing schemes is informative in 
this respect. 
Design elements of pay for performance systems
Payment for performance schemes operate in many 
different ways, but they share common and fundamen-
tal features. Most of the potential designs have already 
been used in one form or another, and many of them 
require important trade-offs, the relative impacts and 
risks of which are currently unknown. Some of the 
core design choices are elaborated below.
objectives
The objectives and targets expressed in a pay for 
performance system are the goals against which 
progress against achievement is assessed. Although 
most schemes focus on quality, performance objec-
tives could cover a wide range of variables including 
volume, equity, patient satisfaction, patient safety, and 
cost effectiveness.2
unit of assessment
Pay for performance schemes vary in terms of who 
receives financial incentives. Rewards could be tar-
geted at individual clinicians, clinical teams, or larger 
organisational units. In theory, rewards should be paid 
to those responsible for delivering improved perform-
ance, but in practice attribution is difficult because 
of the interlocking nature of much health care. Most 
schemes have focused on rewarding groups of practi-
tioners, such as a primary care practice.
Performance measures
A fundamental decision is whether to focus on meas-
ures of process or outcome. Although clinical out-
comes link more closely with the objectives of a health 
system, it is often not feasible to collect and dissemi-
nate such data in time for incentive payments.
Box 1 | Why link financial rewards to quality and performance?
•	Desire	to	curb	costs;	enhance	quality,	safety,	and	access;	and	reduce	variations	in	health	care
•	Accumulating	evidence	that	better	processes	of	care	(timely	use	of	diagnostics,	appropriate	
use	of	treatments,	etc)	will	improve	patient	outcomes
•	Present	payment	arrangements	do	not	reward	quality	or	performance	and	may	provide	
disincentives	in	some	clinical	areas3
•	Perceptions	that	intrinsic	motivations	(such	as	professionalism)	alongside	weak	self	
regulation	have	been	insufficient	to	tackle	failings	in	quality	and	performance7
•	Recent	theories	from	psychology,	economics,	and	organisational	behaviour	highlighting	the	
use	of	incentives8
•	Emergence	of	systems	to	measure	quality	and	performance	and	ability	to	extract	detailed	data	
•	Perceptions	that	indirect	incentives	implicit	in	public	reporting	of	quality	of	health	care	
have	not	produced	desired	improvements2
•	Evidence	from	other	industries	and	public	services	that	linking	financial	incentives	to	
performance	can	improve	service	quality2	
•	Previous	limited	efforts	linking	doctors’	pay	to	the	quality	of	care	had	positive	outcomes,	
including	increased	immunisation	rates	and	geographical	equity9
•	Doctors’	gradual	acceptance	that	quality	of	care	can	be	measured	and	that	pecuniary	
incentives	have	a	role	in	securing	high	quality	services
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analysis and interpretation of performance data
To attribute poor measured performance to poor 
actual performance it is necessary to make causal 
inferences from observed data. However, because 
of the high interdependency of health systems many 
external factors weaken the link between actual per-
formance and measured performance (not least case 
mix and chance variability). Raw data therefore has 
to be adjusted to take into account the confounding 
effects of external circumstances and case mix. Such 
adjustment can itself be controversial.
Performance standards
The performance criteria or thresholds used to deter-
mine whether payments are triggered. may be absolute 
or relative. Absolute standards (such as specific targets 
for key measures) have the advantage that there is no 
uncertainty over whether a standard has been met.2 
Relative standards (such as rewards for high position-
ing in league tables and rankings) focus instead on 
performance relative to peers. These approaches can 
be used selectively—for example, to reward improve-
ment rather than position—because high performing 
providers may have little opportunity to improve their 
relative position.
financial rewards
The size of the financial reward provided by a pay for 
performance scheme is perhaps the key factor moti-
vating changes in behaviour. If the reward is small 
the effect may be negligible. Conversely, large incen-
tives may lead to major, potentially unpredictable, 
changes. As rewards rise, so does the risk of adverse 
consequences. Responses may also be influenced by 
whether the performance payments are a potential 
gain or a potential loss. Current schemes for primary 
care in New Zealand place at risk only a small percent-
age of total payments, whereas the UK quality and 
outcomes framework theoretically puts at risk up to a 
quarter of practice income.
The effects of pay for performance (good and bad) 
may depend on these detailed design choices, making 
generalisations from one design to another problem-
atic. For example, schemes that focus on individuals 
may work differently from those aimed at practices 
or hospitals.
Current knowledge
Evaluation of pay for performance initiatives has not 
kept pace with the rush to implement them. The lim-
ited number of evaluations are typically small scale 
and are of designs from which it is difficult to gener-
alise, particularly outside the US. One recent review 
of the evidence base to support pay for performance 
found only seven published studies and concluded 
that, despite the enthusiasm of its proponents, the 
empirical foundations of paying for performance in 
health care are rather weak.10 
A second systematic review used broader search 
and inclusion criteria, identifying 17 studies; it con-
cluded that the literature suggested some possible 
modest positive effects of financial incentives.11 These 
include cost savings to the Medicaid programme from 
shorter nursing home stays12; small improvements in 
cervical cancer screening; and improved immunisa-
tion rates.13 However, several studies found either no 
effect14 or negative effects, such as reduced access to 
health care for the most severely ill patients.15 They 
also noted a tendency towards improvements in docu-
mentation of care rather than a change in the actual 
quality of care.16 The authors stress that most of the 
studies reviewed were merely descriptions rather than 
robust systematic evaluations of pay for perform-
ance schemes and that their findings may have been 
affected by publication bias given the disincentives 
for healthcare executives to publish negative findings 
of such schemes.11
In the UK an assessment of the first year of the qual-
ity and outcomes framework in primary care found 
that family practitioners attained 98% of the available 
points for clinical indicators.17 This was much higher 
than the 75% expected when the scheme was negoti-
ated, resulting in an increase of £23 000 in the gross 
income of the average family practitioner at high cost 
to the tax payer. Thus, whereas the framework places 
a theoretically high proportion of practice income at 
risk (around 25%), in practice most practices secured 
almost the full amount.
High scores on the quality and outcome framework 
Box 2 | Potential unintended effects of pay for performance 
•	Tunnel	vision—a	focus	on	aspects	of	clinical	performance	
that	are	measured	and	neglect	of	unmeasured	areas18
•	Adverse	selection—the	incentive	to	avoid	the	most	
severely	ill	patients
•	Erosion—the	potential	diminution—of	intrinsic	
professional	motivation	as	a	key	attribute	of	high	quality	
health	care19
•	Inequity—creation	of	perverse	incentives	to	exclude	
disadvantaged	groups20
•	Over	compensation—rewarding	providers	who	already	
meet	or	exceed	the	target	threshold
•	Misreporting,	gaming,	or	fraud18
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might have partly resulted from gaming. Some practices 
seemed to have achieved high scores by excluding large 
numbers of patients, although it was unclear whether 
these exclusions were for sound clinical reasons or in 
order to maximise income.4 Even if family practition-
ers have not played the system, there is a widespread 
concern that the targets were too easy to attain and in 
some cases rewarded quality improvements that had 
already taken place.4 Moreover, at least 80% of pri-
mary care work is not covered by the framework and 
thus has no financial incentive. Such experience should 
caution against too high expectations about value for 
money and highlights the potential for ceiling effects 
when schemes are not carefully calibrated. 
Recent evaluation of the quality and outcomes 
framework in Scotland suggests that practices deliv-
ered higher quality than that required to maximise 
their financial income.4 The behavioural drivers thus 
seem to go beyond the financial reward and may 
include, for example, professionalism, pride, or dif-
ferentiating the practice from local peers.4
Getting benefits without problems
Pay for performance in health care is based on a whole 
set of assumptions of uncertain validity and strength: 
•	 Financial	incentives	will	motivate	behavioural	
change
•	 Such	behavioural	change	will	deliver	the	desired	
improvements	in	quality	and	performance
•	 Policy	makers	can	distinguish	between	those	aspects	
of  clinical activity that would benefit from financial 
incentives	and	those	that	would	be	affected	adversely
• The net benefits outweigh any unintended and 
unwanted	responses	(box	2).
Avoiding potential harms may not be easy and will 
require a strong evidence base on all the potential out-
comes of schemes (box 3). Schemes should be viewed 
as dynamic systems that need to be tailored to the needs 
of different professional groups, services, and patients. 
All stakeholders should participate in setting up new 
schemes and pilots should be independently evaluated. 
Once established, schemes will need constant trim-
ming, recalibrating, and balancing to ensure that their 
objectives are being met at the right cost and without 
too many unwanted effects. One important approach 
will be to ensure a balanced selection of measures, thus 
preventing a focus on rewarded areas at the expense of 
other important dimensions of performance; another 
will be to vary the measures that are included year to 
year. Finally, we might think about schemes that reward 
with truly additional money that is spent collectively 
by practitioners in partnership with local service users, 
thus drawing on collective rather than individual mod-
els of motivation.
Drawing conclusions
As yet, we have insufficient evidence to understand 
what works, under what circumstances, and with what 
intended and unintended consequences. Although 
emerging evidence suggests that pay for performance 
may help shape high performance delivery systems, 
there are also big pitfalls and therefore risks that such 
schemes will cost much and deliver little. The chal-
lenges that remain are not merely the technical aspects 
of design but go to the heart of the ideological debate 
over performance motivation. 
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Box 3 | Building evidence on good and bad effects
•	Research	the	motivational	drivers	of	healthcare	professionals	and	how	these	can	be	
harnessed	for	the	social	good
•	Distil	the	international	and	cross	sectoral	experience	with	pay	for	performance
•	Pilot	new	schemes	before	rolling	out	nationally
•	Evaluate	the	economics	of	new	programmes	to	assess	whether	benefits	outweigh	costs
•	Assess	how	schemes	affect	intangible	aspects	of	health	care,	including	professional	values	
and	cultures,	trust	relationships,	and	patient	interaction
•	Monitor	to	ensure	that	specific	patient	groups	are	not	discriminated	against	
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